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Abstract
We present an alternative model of government formation in which
two parties simultaneously and inpendently announce their polices
proposals through a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, to a third party - the for-
mateur -, which picks the one that maximizes its own utility. As a
consequence, the chosen policy proposal is implemented by a govern-
ment coalition composed of the formateur and the party associated
with the selected policy proposal. The model purposedly captures
the political competition arising among the parties other than the for-
mateur for the partnership in the governing coalition. The political
equilibria resulting from the model conﬁrm that the intensiﬁcation of
political competition among the parties, implied by the present frame-
work, is beneﬁcial for the formateur.
1 Introduction
Proportional representation systems raise a theoretical question: How do
parties with diﬀerent interests and electorates form coalition governments in
post-election periods? The literature on government formation points out
1two classes of issues to be determined through this formation process. The
ﬁrst one concerns the distribution of governmental beneﬁts among governing
parties. The second one consists in the identiﬁcation of the policies im-
plemented in the aftermath of government formation. A variety of papers,
following the path traced by Baron and Ferejohn (1988), limited their anal-
ysis to the allocation of beneﬁts, while others, in the spirit of Baron’s (1991)
and Laver’s and Shepsle’s works (1990, 1996), devoted exclusive attention
to the policies stemming from the formation process. Finally, a number of
studies, among which Austen-Smith and Banks’ (1988) and Morelli’s (1999),
addressed both issues. All the aforementioned authors regard government
formation as the result of bargaining mechanisms involving the parties, and
show that political outcomes largely result from political institutions, which
aﬀect the set of both admissible and optimal actions available to the parties,
and ultimately represent the driving force of the political outcome.
The most signiﬁcant institutional feature within the largely adopted bar-
gaining framework turns out to be the order in which parties are called upon
to take their decision, or, in game theory words, the sequence of moves. In-
novating with respect to the previous literature, Morelli (1999) endogenizes
the sequence of moves by introducing a mechanism1 that triggers the selec-
tion of the party whose preferences are closer to the median voter’s as the
ﬁrst mover. Notwhitstanding this relevant improvement, Morelli’s ﬁndings
are not entirely satisfactory, and appear to rely too heavily on the ad hoc
mechanism constructed to allow the ﬁrst move to the party closest to the
median voter; indeed, the equilibrium policy are those proposed by the ﬁrst
mover. Furthermore, as far as we know, all the studies delving into both the
distribution of private beneﬁts and the policy outcomes seem to display an
overwhelming prevalence of the beneﬁts versus the policies in the outcome
determination.
In our view, the relative importance assigned by the parties to the policy
outcomes oﬀset that attributed to the beneﬁt distribution per se. The latter
are hence neglected in the following analysis, a fortiori s i n c eal a r g ef r a c t i o n
of them is tied to the policy outcome, and hence does not require separate
consideration. More generally, it is appropriate to assess that the present
work does not account for the private beneﬁts per se, while it captures those
1The mechanism is justiﬁed by the following story. The Head of the State is entitled
to select the ﬁrst mover, and his preferences are analogous to the median voter’s. As a
consequence, the closest party to the median voter is selected as the ﬁrst mover.
2embodied in the policy dimensions. The core of this paper lies in the ex-
ploration of the consequences of an enhanced competition between parties.
In our opinion, the sequential bargaining setup employed in the mainstream
literature on government formation excessively constrains the parties and
restrains their potential for competition. The present work purposedly ex-
pands the room for such competition by framing a mechanism, in which all
the political groups except for one simultaneously make a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer, and one of the parties exogenously chosen as the formateur optimally
selects his coalition partners. Simultaneity represents the key novelty that
widens the scope for inter-parties competition.
Finally, the model provides for the possibility that the relative ranking, in
terms of importance, of the diﬀerent policy issues are not homogenous across
parties. This assumption implicitly incorporates the private beneﬁts alloca-
tion into the model. For instance, it may be plausible that environmental
policies are deemed the most relevant by the green party. However, it may
be as much true that one of the party overcares about a norm to incentivate
automobile purchases simply because the major automobile companies are
among its ﬁnancial supporters.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 carachterizes the equilbrium. Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
Consider the process of constitution of a government among three parties,
denoted i = {j,k,f}, within an assembly in which none of them is majori-
tarian. Suppose the government has to agree on n policy issues, denoted
as π =( π1,...,πn), to be implemented. Deﬁne a government protocol as
an n−tuple t∗ =( t1∗,...,tn∗) of equilibrium policies, one for each policy
issue. The preferences of the parties are Euclidean, and they are deﬁned
over the vector of policy dimensions π. Each party has an ideal policy over
each policy dimension, and the ideal policy vector for party i is denoted by
xi =( x1
i,...,xn
i ). Each party ranks diﬀerently the various policy issues. De-
ﬁne νi =( ν1
i,...,νn
i ) as the vector of realtive weights attributed by party i




i =1 , ∀i; since weights
represent a relative measure of the policy ordering for each party, such nor-
malization is legitimate. Write xM =( x1
M,...,x n
M) the vector of the median









. In this perfect information framework, both the matrix





















are common knowledge. Because of the previously illustrated motives, par-
ties do not bargain over private beneﬁts per se. We assume the following










i |, ∀i ∈ {f,j,k} (1)
The bargaining proceeds as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, a party is selected as
the formateur. Without loss loss of generality, say f is picked in this capacity.
In the second stage, the two remaining parties, j and k, simultaneously









k). tj (tk) should be interpreted as the vector of policies that the
government will implement should j (k) be selected as the coalition partner
by the formateur. In the ﬁnal stage, the formateur chooses either j or k (and
the associated tj or tk)t om a x i m i z ei t so w nu t i l i t y ,a n dt h eg o v e r n m e n ti s
constituted.
Intuitively, despite the implemented proposal is actually proposed by a
diﬀerent party than the formateur, still the competition between the two
parties, j and k, to be part of the government, should intuitively drive the
result closer to the formateur’s ideal policy.
3 Equilibrium characterization
3.1 Single policy dimension
At ﬁrst, we consider a simple case of competition arising on a single policy
dimension. The ﬁrst result establishes the obvious irrelevance of weights
under these circumstances.
Lemma 1 The weights V are irrelevant when the government formation
process contemplates a bargaining over a single policy issue.





i =1 , ∀i, the result follows by noticing that in this case




The next discussion is devoted to the characterization of the equilibira.
There are two possible cases: xM = xf,.or xM 6= xf. We start by examining
the former, in which the median ideal policy is the formateur’s.
Proposition 2 In a political game characterized by three parties, a single
policy dimension, and xM = xf, the ideal policy of the formateur is imple-
mented.
Proof. We start by showing the non optimality of all the non-equilibrium
outcomes. Without loss of generality, assume that the ideal policies are such
that: xk ≤ xf ≤ xj.S u p p o s e a p o l i c y d i ﬀerent than the median one is
implemented. There are two possibilities:
1) t∗ >x f. In this case, k prefers to propose xf <t k <t ∗, thus being
selected by the formateur and implementing a policy closer to xk;
2) t∗ <x f. Now, j prefers to propose t∗ <t j <x f, thus being selected by
the formateur, and implementing a policy closer to xj.
Now, we prove the optimality of the equilibrium strategy. For t∗ = xf,we
need either that tk = xf, or that tj = xf, or both. Say t∗ = tk = xf. If j
deviates, whatever the original tj was, either it is not chosen, or it can be
chosen if it proposes tj = xf. However, by this proposal, it gets exactly the
same utility as under t∗, so the deviation is not proﬁtable. If t∗ = tj = xf ,
the choice of the coalition partner is irrelevant for both the formateur, and
the other two parties, neither of which, by the previous argument, has a
proﬁtable deviation.
The result shows that competition between parties j and k allows the
formateur to get xf, its ideal policy, as the unique equilibrium outcome as
long as xf is median.
We now pass to the second case, and examine the situation in which the
f o r m a t e u r ’ si d e a lp o l i c yi sn o tt h em e d i a no n e .
Proposition 3 A political game characterized by three parties, a single pol-
icy dimension, and xm 6= xf, has multiple Nash equilibria outcomes, repre-
sented by the set of policies lying the interval between the formateur’s ideal
policy and the median party’s ideal policy. Formally, xM = xk (xj) ⇔ t∗ ∈
5[xM,xf]. However, for any equilibrium such that t∗∗ ∈ (xM,xf], there exists
a single strategy implementing (tj,t k) it, given by tj = tk = t∗∗; on the other
hand, there exist multiple strategies implementing the equilibrium t∗∗∗ = xM,
given by the set tj = t∗∗∗,t k ≤ t∗∗∗.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that xk ≤ xj ≤ xf. The proposi-
tion assesses that there are multiple equilibria, and all equilibria belong to
the set [xj,x f]. We now rule out all other equilibria, speciﬁcally all the policy
belonging to the interval [xk,x j). Assume that t∗ ∈ [xk,x j). Then, j ﬁnds it
proﬁtable to propose tj such that t∗ <t j <x j . He will thus be selected
by the formateur and will improve upon his initial utility. All the remaining
policies outside the Pareto set cannot clearly be equilibrium policies. Now,
we prove that all t∗∗ ∈ (xj,x f] are equilibrium outcomes resulting from a
strategy (tj,t k) prescribing t∗∗ = tj = tk ∈ (xj,x f]. Then, if j (or k) deviates
by proposing tj (or tk) <t ∗∗, then its proposal will be rejected by the for-
mateur, and thus it is indiﬀerent between the two situations. If on the other
hand j (or k) deviate by proposing tj (or tk) >t ∗∗, its oﬀer will be accepted,
but it will yield a lower utility than the utility achieved under t∗. Finally,
we show that t∗∗∗ = xj is an equilibrium outcome resulting from a larger set
of strategies (tj,t k):tj = t∗∗∗,t k ≤ t∗∗∗. Such a strategy set implements xj.
Hence, j would not have a proﬁtable deviation, while k0s only relevant devi-
ation - which would entail a diﬀerent policy outcome - happens if tk >x j.
In this case, tk would be implemented, causing k0s utility to dwindle. The
deviation is therefore not proﬁtable.
In conclusion, if the formateur’s ideal policy is not the median one, the
competition between parties is not suﬃcient to drive the policy to the ﬁrst
best for the formateur. Furthermore, if we are willing to share the idea that,
in the instance of multiple equilibiria, an equilibrium is relative more likely
to arise if the set of strategies that implements it is larger, it is possible
to claim that the implementation of xM is relatively more likely than the
implementation of any other equilibrium outcome. A stronger result holds
under the assumption that neither of the parties’ proposals is outside the
Pareto set.
Proposition 4 Under the assumption the strategy set for j and k is limited
to the Pareto set, a political game characterized by three parties, a single
policy dimension, and xm 6= xf, yields a unique Nash equilibria outcome not
6involving the play of weakly dominated strategy, represented by the median
party’s ideal policy. Formally, (tj,t k) ∈ (a,b),a =m i n {xi,x k,x f},b =
max{xi,x k,x f},x M = xk (xj) ⇒ tTH = xM.
Proof. We stick to the notation used in the previous proof, and prove that
all the equilibria implementing a policy diﬀerent than the median ideal pol-
icy involve the play of weakly dominated strategies even when the admissible
strategy set is limited to the Pareto set. Suppose without loss of generality
that xk ≤ xj ≤ xf. Given any t∗∗ ∈ (xj,x f], the only strategy (tj,t k) im-
plementing t∗∗ is the one prescribing t∗∗ = tj = tk ∈ (xj,x f],a sp r e v i o u s l y
illustrated. However, playing tk is weakly dominated by playing t0
k <t k for
k. There are three possibilities to consider:
1) |xf − tk| < |xf − tj| < |xf − t0
k|. In this case, when k proposes tk,i ti s
chosen by the formateur, while when it proposes t0
k, the formateur prefers j.
However, tj Âk tk, thus t0
k Âk tk.
2) |xf − tj| < |xf − tk| < |xf − t0
k|. In this case, k is not chosen by the
formateur in either case; hence, t0
k ∼k tk.
3) |xf − tk| < |xf − t0
k| < |xf − tj|. In this case, the formateur chooses
k under both proposals. However, t0
k yields k a higher utility; therefore,
t0
k Âk tk.
In conclusion, ∀tj ∈ (a,b),a=m i n{xi,x k,x f},b=m a x{xi,x k,x f},t 0
k ºk
tk. Therefore, tk is weakly dominated. On the other hand, the implementa-
tion of tTH = xM does not involve the play of weakly dominated strategy by
any of the two players.
3.2 Double policy dimension
We assume now that there are two policy issues, denoted by π1 and π2,
on which the two parties j and k compete to be selected as government’s
partner by the formateur. By now, we assume that all parties have the same
valuation for each policy dimension, say vπ
i = 1
2,i= {j,k,f},π= {1,2}.I n
one dimension, we found that when the formateur’s ideal policy is median, the
unique Nash equilibrium implements the formateur’s ideal policy; otherwise,
when the formateur’s ideal policy is not median, there exist multiple Nash
equilibria spanning the whole set of policies located between the median ideal
policy and the formateur’s ideal policy. As intuitively plausible, it turns out
that the same logic applies in two dimensions. For the policy dimension(s) in
which the median ideal policy is the formateur’s, the unique Nash equilibrium
7prescribes the implementation of the formateur’s policy in that dimension(s);
on the other hand, for the policy dimension(s) for which the median ideal
policy is not the formateur’s, there exist multiple Nash equilibria for that
dimension(s), spanning the set of policies located between the median ideal
policy and the formateur’s. In conclusion, we have the following general
result:
Proposition 5 In a political game characterized by three parties, two policy
dimensions and equal weights across policies and across parties, the set of
Nash equilibrium outcomes is the following: for the policies for which the
formateur has the median ideal policy, the unique equilibrium outcome is
the ideal formateur’s policy, while for the policies for which the formateur
has not the median ideal policy, there are multiple equilibrium outcomes,
belonging to the set between the formateur’s ideal policy and the median ideal
policy. Formally, denote π0 ∈ π each policy dimension with the property that
xπ0
M = xπ0
f , and π00 ∈ π each policy dimension with the property that xπ00
M 6= xπ00
f .
Then, for any π0 we have an unique equilibrium policy t∗π0 = xπ0
M = xπ0
f ; on









Proof. The proof proceeds by a number of steps.
Step 1: Preliminarily, we point out that the utility of each party is the
n e g a t i v eo ft h ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h ei m p l e m e n t e dp o i n t,a n dt h ep a r t y ’ s
ideal point in the two dimension space. The distance is measured as the
sum of the distances between the two policies on each of the two dimensions.
Formally, given a =( a1,a 2),and b =( b1,b 2), where the superscripts still
indicate the dimension, d(a,b)=|a1 − b1| + |a2 − b2|. For example, given
a =( 3 ,6) and b =( 1 1 ,7),w eh a v et h a td(a,b)=|3 − 11| + |6 − 7| =
8+1=9 . This deﬁnition of distance stems from the utility speciﬁcation,
which is the negative of the sum of the distances between the ideal policy
and the implemented one in each dimension. The following proof relies on
the separability on the utility on each dimension, and on the fact that no
interaction exists between the two policies. In other words, a two-dimensional
policy is a Nash equilibrium if and only if both of the policies are equilibrium
policies along their dimension.
Step 2: We now provide a characterization of the equilibrium points. The
equilibrium vectors t∗ are those in which it is not possibile to increase at the
same time the utility of the formateur and the utility of either j or k or both.





that increases both j (k)’s utility and the formateur’s. This









Therefore, t∗ cannot be an equilibrium. Given the measurement of distance,
and as a consequence of utility, in any Nash equilibrium of the game there
must not exist a possibility to move along either policy dimension in a direc-
tion that makes both the formateur and at least one of the two parties closer
to the ideal point.
Step 3: If the formateur’s ideal policy is median in both dimensions,
then its ideal median policy is implemented in equilibrium. Formally, xπ
M =
xπ
f,π = {π1,π2} ⇒ t∗π = xπ
M = xπ
f,π = {π1,π2}, or, equivalently, π1,π2 =
π0 ⇒ t∗π0 = xπ0
M = xπ0
f . To see it, consider any other b t such that c tπ0 6=
xπ0
M 6= xπ0
f ,π 0 being either π1 or π2. Without loss of generality, consider
c tπ0 6= xπ0
M 6= xπ0
f ,π0 = π1, while c tπ0 = xπ0
M = xπ0
f ,π0 = π2. For π0 = π1, we have
that either c tπ1 is on the right of the formateur’s ideal point, or it is on its




f , it has to be that x
π1











k . We now
have four possible locations of c tπ1 :






k . In that case, both j and k have an incentive to
propose c c tπ1 such that x
π1
j > c c tπ1 > c tπ1 for π1, and c c tπ2 = c tπ1 for π2. The vector








k . In this case, k has an incentive to propose c c tπ1
such that x
π1
f > c c tπ1 > c tπ1 for π1, and c c tπ2 = c tπ1 for π2. The vector b b t will be





f < c tπ1 <x
π1
k .I nt h i sc a s e ,j has an incentive to propose c c tπ1
such that x
π1
f < c c tπ1 < c tπ1 for π1, and c c tπ2 = c tπ1 for π2. The vector b b t will be







k < c tπ1. In this case, both j and k have an incentive to
propose c c tπ1 such that x
π1
k < c c tπ1 < c tπ1 for π =1 , and c c tπ2 = c tπ2 for π =2 . The
vector b b t will be selected by the formateur.
Consider instead the following situation: xπ0
j <t ∗π0 = xπ0
f <x π0
k ,π 1,π2 =
π0. Obviously, since the vector t∗ is a satiation point for the formateur, no
oﬀer can make it better oﬀ,t h e r e f o r et∗ must be an equilibrium.
9Step 4: We can generalize the previous result to show that any policy
dimension in which the median ideal policy is the formateur’s, the imple-
mented policy along that dimension is indeed the formateur’s. Formally,
π0 ⇒ t∗π0 = xπ0
M = xπ0





f along π2. Equivalently, π1 = π0,π2 = π00. Suppose




f , and repeat all the ﬁve cases presented in step 3, to show that
there exists a proﬁtable deviation along π1, no matter what happens along




f , cannot be the equilibrium





Step 5: Now, we show that the dimensions along which the formateur
has not the median ideal policy feature multiple equilibrium outcomes, be-
longing to the set stretching between the formateur’s ideal policy and the










of generality, assume that along the dimension π1, the median ideal policy






f , so that π1 = π00. To see that no other
policy may be an equilibrium one, consider an alternative point c tπ1 along








. c tπ1 may have the three
following locations:






f . In this case, both j and k have an incentive to
oﬀer c tπ1 such that c tπ1 < c c tπ1 <x
π1








f . In this case, k has an incentive to oﬀer c c tπ1 such
that c tπ1 < c c tπ1 <x
π1








f < c tπ1. In this case, both j and k have an incentive to
oﬀer c c tπ1 such that c tπ1 > c c tπ1 >x
π1
f . This increases the utility of the formateur,
meanwhile increasing theirs.




k <t ∗π1 <x
π1
f are indeed
Nash equilibria, resulting from a strategy prescribing to both parties to play
t∗π1. Say that k wants to deviate from t∗π1. If it deviates to c tπ1 <t ∗π1, the
deviation is irrelevant, since the formateur will select j, and the outcome will
still be t∗π1. If k deviates to c tπ1 >t ∗π1, it will be chosen by the formateur,
but c tπ1 will yield k a lower utility than t∗π1, thus the deviation is not going
10to be proﬁtable. The same exact argument can be applied for the possible
deviaitons of j. Since the assumption on the location of ideal policies along
π1 is without loss of generality as long as the median ideal policy is not the







































are Nash equilbria for any π00, while all other points d t∗π00 outside this region
are not. On the contrary,
As usual, it is worth remarking that the policy dimensions are equilibrium-
independent, in the sense that the equilibrium outcomes in one dimension do
not aﬀect the equilibrium outcomes along the other. In other words, what
counts to determine the equilibrium outcomes on one dimension is only the
location of preferences on that dimension.
As a consequence of the equilibrium characterization in two dimensions,
we have some interesting implications on the relation between equilibrium
outcomes and Pareto sets.
Corollary 6 All equilibrium vectors t∗ are included in the Pareto set gener-
ated by the three parties.
Proof. Say they were not in the Pareto set. Then there would exist a vector
t0 that Pareto dominates t∗. T h ef a c tt h a ti ti sp r e f e r r e db yt h et w op a r t i e s
implies that the parties will propose it, the fact that it is preferred by the
formateur implies that the formateur will accept it. Therefore, there would
exist a proﬁtable deviation from t∗. But then t∗ cannot be an equilibrium.
Thus, a Nash equilibrium has to be in the Pareto set.
At this point, we have all the ingredients to generalize the results for
a wider set of possible weights. The following proposition shows that the
results obtained for two dimensions are robust to any distribution of weights
across the parties and the policies that assigns a strictly positive weight to
every policy of every party.
Corollary 7 As long as all the weights assigned by all the parties are strictly
positive, for any arbitrary set of weights, the equilibrium outcome is a (not
necessarily proper) subset of the equilibria under the case of homogenous
11w e i g h t sa c r o s sp o l i c i e sa n da c r o s sp a r t i e s.F o r m a ll y ,d e n o t i n gt h ee q u i l i b r i u m
with arbitrary weights t+, we have that as long as vπ













































Proof. Consider a new distribution of weights along a dimension π0 ,i n
which the median ideal ideal policy is the formateur’s, such that vπ0
i > 0,∀i.
Then, no matter how small the valuation for the policy π0 is for the three
parties, if the parties have a proﬁtable deviation, they will still want to
deviate. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w en o ws h o wt h a ta l lpo i n t sc tπ0 6= xπ0
f that diﬀer from the
formateur’s ideal point are indeed not equilibria. Without loss of generality,
consider c tπ0 6= xπ0
M 6= xπ0
f ,π0 = π1. For π0 = π1, we have that either c tπ1 is on





f , i th a st ob et h a tx
π1




k . Without loss






k . We now have four possible locations
of c tπ1 :






k . In that case, both j and k have an incentive
to propose c c tπ1 such that x
π1
j > c c tπ1 > c tπ1 for π = π1, and the formateur will
select the party associated with c c tπ1,t h u sa c h i e v i n gaP a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n tf o r







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
c c tπ1 − xi






¯ ¯ ¯c tπ1 − xi
¯ ¯ ¯. Intuitively,
even if the policy is valued very little, it is still proﬁtable for each party to
deviate to a policy closer to its ideal point.
2) x
π1




k . In this case, k has an incentive to propose c c tπ1
such that x
π1
f > c c tπ1 > c tπ1 for π = π1. B yt h es a m et o k e n ,t h ev e c t o rb b t will





f < c tπ1 <x
π1
k .I nt h i sc a s e ,j has an incentive to propose c c tπ1
such that x
π1








k < c tπ1. In this case, both j and k have an incentive
to propose c c tπ1 such that x
π1
k < c c tπ1 < c tπ1 for π = π1. The vector b b t will be
selected by the formateur.
12T h es a m ea r g u m e n ta sb e f o r ec a nb ea p p l i e dt os h o wt h a tf o rνπ00
i > 0,i=





































remebering that no matter how little the valuation of that policy is, the par-
ties still prefer to deviate to a policy closer to its ideal points. The proof is
not repeated here beacuse of its perfect analogy with the proof of proposition
4.
3.3 Multiple policy dimensions
In spite of being referred to a bidimensional policy space, the previous anal-
ysis has shown that with the present speciﬁcation of the utility function,
the equilibrium outcomes on a policy dimension are independent of the equi-
librium outcomes on all other policy dimensions, except for the interaction
between them represented by the weights vπ
i . However, we have shown that
as long as vπ
i > 0,∀i,∀π, the results obtained for constant weights across
policies and across parties hold unchanged. We are now ready to present
a general result, valid on multiple dimensions under the condition that all
parties attribute positive weights to all policies.
Proposition 8 In a political game characterized by three parties, n policy
dimensions and equal weights for all policies and all parties, the set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes is the following: for the policies for which the forma-
teur has the median ideal policy, the unique equilibrium outcome is the ideal
formateur’s policy, while for the policies for which the formateur has not
the median ideal policy, there are multiple equilibrium outcomes, belonging
to the set between the formateur’s ideal policy and the median ideal policy.
Formally, denote π0 ⊂ π the subset ofs policy dimension with the property
that xπ0
M = xπ0
f , and π00 ⊂ π the subset of policy dimensions with the prop-
erty that xπ00
M 6= xπ00
f . Then, for any π0 we have an unique equilibrium policy
t∗π0 = xπ0
M = xπ0
f ; on the other hand, for any π00, there exist multiple equilib-










Proof. As the weights are homogenous across policies and across parties,
the only way for a party to achieve a proﬁtable deviation consists in the
implementation of a policy coser to its ideal point. Therefore, the analysis
performed for the bidimensional case may be readily extended, and the results
follow.
13In analogy with the bidimensional case, for all the dimensions for which
the median ideal policy is not the formateur’s, the only equilbrium outcome
achievable without the play of weakly dominated strategies is the one pre-
scribing the implementation of the median ideal policy.
Furthermore, a second analogy with the previously examined situations
is worth being pointed out. Allowing for arbitrary weights in the multidi-
mensional case weakly shrinks the set of Nash equilibria.
3.4 Case of null valuations
We now brieﬂy extend our analysis to capture the possiblity of null valuations
for some of the parties. We do it for the single dimensional case, knowing that
the results can be easily extended to the bidimensional and multidiemensional
case. We ﬁnd that the presence of null valuations aﬀects the equilibrium
outcomes in a signiﬁcant way.
Proposition 9 For any policy π000 ⊂ π0 for which the formateur is median
and either j or k have a null valuation, there are multiple equilibrium out-
comes, included in the set between the formateur’s ideal policy and the positive
valuation party’s ideal policy. Formally,
∀π
























Proof. Say k has a null valuation, and xj <x f. Then all the policies outside
the interval [xf,x j] are not equilibria, as for each of them j can proﬁtably
deviate, and propose a policy within the interval [xf,x j]. On the other hand,
a strategy set (tj,t k) prescribing tj = tk ∈ [xf,x j] is indeed an equilibrium,
since k would have no interest in deviating, because of his null valuation,
whereas j would want to deviate to t0
j <t j, but not to t00
j >t j. However, if
he deviates to t0
j,t k Âf t0
j; hence, the formateur chooses tk;s i n c etk ∼j tj,
the deviation to t0
j is not proﬁtable. The result is thus proved.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The paper develops a stylized model aimed at capturing the political com-
petition involving the parties willing to participate in a government. While
14a more complex model may describe more accurately the sequence of actions
that parties can take, our view is that the main eﬀect of a more articulated
string of possible actions lies in the enhancement of political competition
between parties; such competition can be approximated by a framework of
simultaneous and independent take-it-or-leave oﬀers whose details have been
previously discussed.
The political equilibria implied by the model show, not surprisingly, that
the simultaneous and independent take-it-or-leave oﬀers beneﬁtt h ef o r m a -
teur. The force of competition between parties is strong enough to unam-
bigously foster the prevalence of the formateur’s ideal policy for all the di-
mensions along which the latter is located in-between the other two parties’
ideal policies; if, on the other hand, the formateur’s ideal policy is not me-
dian, the model predicts multiple equilibria. Competition per se does not
insure in this case the unambigous prevalence of the formateur’s ideal policy
on the dimensions along which the median ideal policy is not median.
The competition is driven not only by diﬀerences in ideal policies, but
also by heterogeneity in weights. When weights diﬀer, the set of equilibrium
policies, for the dimension along which the median ideal policy is not the for-
mateur’s, shrinks toward the formateur’s ideal point. Basically, the weights
play the role of an additional source of competition.
The paper neglects the distribution of beneﬁts; in spite of the previously
discussed political reason for their exclusion, a possible extension of this
model could consist in the check of the robustness of the ﬁndings to the
introduction of private beneﬁts into the game. Moreover, general results
applicable to an arbitrary number of parties would be desirable. Finally, a
more general speciﬁcation of the utility function may serve as a useful test
for the robustness of the outcomes.
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